Nagorno-Karabakh War

What little stabilizing effect the Russian Federation once may have had on the region has been greatly diminished following their struggle in their conflict with Ukraine.

Today, Azerbaijani forces have entered the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, supposedly carrying out an operation to quell 'local terrorist activities'. Armenian sources claim Baku is causing a humanitarian catastrophe.

Uncertain times.

Essentially, Iran supports Amernia and Turkey supports Azerbaijan.

I'm going to say for Iran this is to counter the local pro-Azeri separatism?

At the height of the (First) Nagorno-Karabakh War, during a period of a severe shortage of weapons for the Armenian side, commanders of volunteer detachments looked for any opportunity to obtain weapons.

Mikhail Tarkhanyan was one of these commanders and fate brought him to Syunik to the house of an elderly and blind grandmother. For a period of time, this grandmother had an affair with Garegin Nzhdeh. The grandmother handed commander Tarkhanyan a map that Garegin left. The map detailed the locations where, before Nzhdeh’s departure from Armenia, he buried all the weapons that his small army had in the mountains.

Commander Tarkhanyan gave the map to Mikhail Kalantaryan, an entrepreneur, with a request to find and excavate these weapons as soon as possible. The local population including schoolchildren participated in the excavations as well. The result was that all the marked places on the map actually contained rifles, ammunition, and artillery shells from the times of World War I and were still operable. All of these invaluable weapons were cleaned and sent to the Karabakh front.

Even in death, our great Garegin Nzhdeh helped our nation. Even in death he supplied weapons to the Armenian side in the First Nagorno-Karabakh War.

I recall one of his famous quotes, perhaps a signal for the future:

“Even after death, I will be with my nation” -Garegin Nzhdeh

These are the noteworthy segments from a 3-hour session that you can watch . Country names are shortened: ART = Artsakh, etc. This translation is not a direct quote but rather a collection of shortened statements supplemented by my clarifications in [square brackets].

(Pashinyan): Today I will provide details from the 44-day war and the negotiation process preceding it. This is the chain of events during the 2020 war:

October 4

Azeri forces concentrate in the south and break through our defense line.

October 8

AZE offers ARM a temporary ceasefire if ARM forces retreat along the river Araks, give Khudaferi reservoir to AZE, and handed over prisoners. I rejected it since it was going to be a very brief ceasefire.

October 9

AZE agrees to a ceasefire starting October 10. We sent our foreign ministers to Moscow. RUS makes an announcement about reaching a ceasefire.

October 10

AZE breaks the ceasefire hours later and resumes the offensive against ART proper, bombards the capital Stepanakert, attacks Hadrut. AZE refuses an offer to deploy RUS monitors on both sides of the border.

following days

I didn't believe AZE would honor any ceasefire deal unless they were physically stopped on the battlefield. If we failed to stop them, we had to go for diplomatic concessions.

October 13

I asked Putin to tell me honestly: what do I need to do to stop the war?

October 16

Putin answers me: return 5 regions, no status for ART. We agreed to launch a work around this proposal.

October 17

France's Macron informs me that AZE has agreed to an unconditional ceasefire starting tomorrow. However, AZE completely ignored it, there was no sign of a ceasefire.

October 19, noon

I inquire Putin about his ceasefire plan on returning 5 regions without any status for ART. Putin says it's essentially the long-standing Russian plan: give 5 regions now and 2 later, establish the Lachin corridor, deploy RUS peacekeepers, ART status would be delayed.

I asked for time to think and discuss it internally. I hang up and invited non-parliamentary opposition parties to discuss it. We then held a Security Council session involving parliamentary opposition parties. I informed them about my decision to call Putin and accept his plan, and that the reason I summoned the opposition figures was only to inform them about my decision, and that I wasn't trying to convince them to "share the blame with me". I would take full responsibility.

that evening

I call Putin and agree to his plan. Putin says he'll speak with Aliyev. Fizuli and Jabrayil regions had already fallen.

October 19 night, Putin's plan, Shushi, Meghri corridor

Putin calls back: now AZE wants all 7 regions immediately, AZE refugees would return to Shushi (pre-war 90% of the population were Azeri per AZE claims), and they would return to other settlements of Karabakh as well. Putin supported this idea but he wanted to tie the return of refugees to the clarification of ART's legal status. Both events would happen simultaneously. I agreed, but Aliyev rejected the idea of clarifying ART's status.

During this time, there was a proposal that would have allowed AZE to send 50,000 Azeris to visit Shushi as "guests" with the intent to permanently repopulate the city. There were no guarantees this wouldn't happen. AZE wanted a new AZE-Shushi road via Kubatli to secure their movement. In other words, Shushi would be 90% Azeri, have a road to AZE, Shushi territories would be split from the Lachin corridor. AZE soldiers would be stationed there.

To me, this was the same as surrendering Shushi. I rejected it primarily because AZE soldiers could, at any time, cut off the Lachin corridor due to close proximity. The latest "environmentalist" blockade of 2022 proved that my suspicions were warranted.

This wasn't all. According to the proposal, RUS peacekeepers would be stationed not only in Lachin and ART, but also in ARM's Meghri to guarantee AZE's connection to Nakhichevan. I rejected it because it was going to be a corridor outside of our control.

October 19-20 ceasefire offer recap

Give all 7 regions, no status for ART, AZE keeps the territories they captured from ART proper [NKAO], Shushi is practically surrendered to Azeris, Meghri corridor is given to AZE. I rejected it then, and I would have rejected it now if I was offered the same deal today. I offered them a road managed by Armenia, not a corridor.

October 23

USA reaches a ceasefire to be honored starting October 26.

October 26

AZE never honors the USA ceasefire and continues the attack. ARM forces were successfully defending 90% of borders, except for the 9th Defense Ring which was penetrated on Oct. 4 up to Jebrayil. I believed we had to try to stop the advance physically because all attempts for a ceasefire were going to be futile. The alternative was painful concessions.

I went live on Facebook to discuss "painful concessions", but I still wasn't ready to surrender Shushi and the Meghri corridor. Shushi was still under ARM control and we were determined to stop the AZE advance.

fall of Shushi, army leadership's "deceptions"

I gave an order to reinforce Shushi because its fall would likely mean the fall of the capital Stepanakert and the encirclement of 25,000 Armenian troops in Martakert. ART president Arayik Harutyunyan informed me that AZE soldiers had reached the Lachin-Stepanakert road via village Zarisli, but our CoGS [led by Onik Gasparyan] denied this claim.

This wasn't new. Throughout the war, on dozens of occasions, ART officials would give us info but our CoGS would either not confirm it or outright deny it, to then admit that it was correct.

November 6: take Aghdam, give us Hadrut

Ceasefire negotiations begin. I agreed to sign a document as long as we wouldn't surrender Shushi or Meghri corridor. I also offered to surrender the Aghdam region in exchange for the Hadrut region.

November 7, noon

CoGS Onik Gasparyan reports that Shushi has fallen. I didn't take it lightly because I had ordered them to use all available resources for its defense. I was reassured by CoGS. Upon learning the news, I order CoGS to prepare a plan to retake the city. ARM forces launch a counterattack.

CoGS reported a successful . I was told that ARM forces reentered the city in some locations. I was told until the last day that our forces held small parts of the city.

November 8

CoGS reassures me that a part of Shushi is held by ARM forces. I believed that maintaining partial control of Shushi would be crucial for more favorable negotiations.

November 8-9

Putin and I held 20 phone calls. AZE rejected my Aghdam-Hadrut exchange offer. The drafted agreement says nothing about Shushi, Hadrut, or Meghri corridor.

November 9, early morning

I sign the agreement, but AZE rejects it. They want more.

November 9, evening

AZE presents its new demand: [unilateral] surrender of Tavush enclaves. I reject it outright. Tavush enclaves are removed from the once-again-still-draft document.

November 9, night

AZE launches an attack on Stepanakert with drones.

November 9, midnight

ARM and AZE finally sign a newly drafted agreement. It's not as good as the morning proposal, but it no longer included a Meghri corridor or Tavush enclaves.

November 10

Opposition activists attack and hijack Armenian gov't buildings.

November 12

I return to my office and learn that ARM forces had no foothold in Shushi.

was it possible to avoid the 2020 war?

Here is what always comes to my mind: Lisbon conference and LTP's [Levon Ter-Petrosyan] "war or peace" article, the need for mutual concessions, that we can't maintain the status quo, that we can't engage in self-deception, and that the world doesn't want independent ART.

LTP said the priority was for ART to be Armenian-populated, but he didn't explain how to achieve that. LTP's opponents became furious because a year earlier he ran under a tougher election slogan about "peace and stability".

LTP eventually resigns and claims that only 6 people are experts in ART conflict: Arakadiy Ghukasyan, Robert Kocharyan, Alexander Arzumanyan, Vardan Oskanyan, Gerard Libaridyan, and LTP himself. In reality, there was nothing special about these "experts". The most important negotiation documents were already public but since the general population was clueless due to lack of internet and access to info, this group was considered to be "experts".

us vs. the world

1993: UNSC states that Armenian forces have invaded 7 Azeri regions, demands withdrawal, and refers to ART as an Azeri region.

1996 Lisbon: The world makes it clear to ARM that they view ART as part of AZE, although ART can still have a high level of autonomy within AZE. In Lisbon, ARM was the only member to veto the statement, which was supported even by the OSCE Minsk Group superpowers.

In December, the OSCE chief defended ARM & AZE's territorial integrity and ART's right to self-determination as long as that self-determination was within AZE's territorial integrity.

borders

In 1991 ARM accepted AZE's territorial integrity. There was the 1991 CIS agreement in Belovezh [Dec 8], ratified by ARM & AZE parliaments. The territorial integrity was later reaffirmed in the Almaty agreement [Dec 20]. Both Belovezh and Almaty touch upon self-determination & minority rights.

LTP out, Rob in

Feb 1998: LTP resigns and "expert" Robert Kocharyan [Rob] takes over. He criticizes LTP's willingness to accept "loser" concessions. During Rob's tenure, Armenia drifts further away from the world's stance.

Rob publicly tells the public that he'll adopt a tougher stance, but in reality, his actions are in line with the 1996 Lisbon, 1991 CIS, and the world's view that ART's status should be decided within AZE territorial integrity.

Rob removes ART representatives from the negotiation table. ART was still a full negotiation party when Rob took over. Poof: OSCE presented ART-AZE "union state" proposal separately to the ART delegation in Nov. 1998, proving that they were still a separate party. This is the last time ART is a party.

Another proof: OSCE's FRA co-chair Bernard Fassier visited ART on 2 Oct 2009 and revealed that ART was removed from the table at the decision of ARM leaders. Another proof: On 11 Nov 2019 Lavrov said that one of ARM's ex-presidents decided that ART's interests will be represented by ARM.

Another proof: LTP announced in 2012 that Rob - with the agreement of ART leader Arkadiy Ghukasyan - removed ART from the negotiation table. This was the biggest gift to AZE.

Another proof: Rob himself said on 3 Apr 2004 to "Golos Armenia" channel: there was an impression that ARM was prepared for concessions but ART was blocking it. Since ARM could pressure ART to comply, I suggested changing this impression by using ARM's resources to ensure ARM is not merely a proxy of ART, so that ARM would have its own stance around the negotiation table. I successfully did so.

By doing so, Rob violated the principles of the 10 Dec 1991 Declaration of Independence by ART. He deprived them of independent decision-making.

goodbye old friend

By doing so, Rob deprived ART of the ONLY internationally recognized platform where they were represented. This was the end of Artsakh being perceived as a separate international subject.

Why did Rob do this? He won the 1998 elections amid reports of falsifications. He couldn't even become a president because he wasn't an ARM citizen and hadn't resided in ARM for at least 10 years. Totally illegitimate. Perhaps he sacrificed ART's status as a subject in order to win international legitimacy for his regime, so the world would ignore his illegal takeover of ARM.

Why did the world support Rob's decision to remove ART from the table? ART's removal would streamline the process and make negotiations easier for the world. The world would deal with 2 recognized countries that had to abide by international rules. ART, on the other hand, could behave freely and the world had little leverage over it.

Even worse. During the Istanbul conference of 19 Nov 1999, Rob voted in favor of the Charter for European Security. Its human rights section states: minority rights should not question territorial integrity, and must be within borders.

The 1999 Istanbul was the continuation of 1996 Lisbon. These two are later used by AZE to bolster its stance: no amount of self-determination can violate my territorial integrity.

Regarding the 1999 Istanbul Charter: our opposition argues that these docs weren't explicitly about ART. They are correct that it wasn't explicitly about ART, but when two countries have an argument, they must rely on an available legitimate set of rules, including the ones they had agreed to in the past.

United Nations Security Council

The 1993 UNSC resolutions were a heavy blow for us. They demanded the immediate withdrawal of Armenian forces. Armenian forces are called "occupational", ART is referred to as an AZE region, and refugees must return. This meant we couldn't capitalize on our military victories of 1990s during future diplomatic negotiations while using international platforms and international mediators. LTP understood this. He knew that the successes that were achieved while "violating international rules" didn't "count" during the diplomatic negotiations.

public stance vs. private stance

1997-1998: The topic of ART conflict is widely discussed in public. Rob comes to power, and two realities are formed: one among "experts", and one for the public. Officials would occasionally invite analysts and tell them that we were headed to a diplomatic victory. And to those analysts who realized that things weren't actually great, the govt would wink at them and hit that this was all just a ploy to "buy time". In reality, AZE was the one buying time while strengthening its army.

little brother

Our biggest victory from the war was the international community's recognition of ART as a separate subject. That was our hope for a successful outcome, but Rob smothered it all by removing ART from the table.

The world asks: Who is trying to achieve self-determination, why isn't ART the negotiator, why is ARM speaking on its behalf? 1998 is when the world started to view this as a territorial dispute between ARM and AZE.

This meant that ARM became the target of the 1993 UNSC resolutions, rather than the "ethnic Armenian forces of ART". Before this, the UNSC's only urge to ARM was to pressure ART forces. All arrows were now pointed at ARM because ARM was the sole party to negotiations that could decide whether to return the regions or not. Before Rob, ARM was "untouchable" here.

The worst-case scenario began to materialize for ARM. Now ARM was viewed as an occupier. But I believe Rob removed ART intentionally, for a very specific reason...

Rob's reason

The Lisbon fiasco proved that the concept of self-determination alone was insufficient for achieving full independence for ART, hence Rob's decision to turn it into a territorial dispute and change the essence. I believe this was a major mistake. Now ARM's territory was also up for negotiations since now it's an ARM-AZE territorial dispute.

1999 Istanbul Charter: victory or defeat?

In 1998-1999 they discussed the ARM-AZE territorial exchange plan. ARM would surrender part of ARM proper to AZE, in exchange for receiving ART. This was essentially a recognition of ART being part of AZE. More on this later.

After I criticized Rob for signing the Charter for European Security in Istanbul, Rob responded with counterarguments, claiming it was a "victory" because it named all post-Soviet conflicts one by one, stating that they must be resolved per territorial integrity, but it didn't mention the ART conflict, so it was a "victory". Rob claims it's a victory because the part about the ART conflict doesn't mention AZE's territorial integrity.

My response to his counterargument: The issue is that the Charter also makes no mention of ARM's territorial integrity, ART's self-determination, and in reality, the ART conflict was separated from Abkhazia/Transnistria conflicts because of ANOTHER reason: at the time of holding the Istanbul meeting, another agreement was being circulated regarding ART conflict, which wasn't about self-determination or the preservation of territorial integrity - it was about a territorial swap between ARM-AZE that I mentioned earlier.

swap Meghri for Nagorno Karabakh

I'll present details from the ARM-AZE territorial exchange document: to permanently resolve their disputes and for the sake of long-term development and peace, ARM and AZE agree to:

1. Nagorno-Karabakh territory, Shushi region, and Lachin region are given to ARM. ARM's Meghri region is given to AZE.

2. Regions Aghdam, Fizuli, Jabrayil, Kubatli, Zangela, Kelbajar, Gazakh, and Shahumyan are given to AZE.

3. Enclaves are exchanged. They are given to the country that surrounds them.

4. ARM removes forces from occupied AZE territories within 60 days under intl. watchdog.

5. Armenian residents of the Meghri region are safely relocated to ARM within 60 days under intl. watchdog. Meghri will be populated by Azeris relocated during the [first] war.

Although this document wasn't adopted thanks to the sacrifices made by Vazgen Sargsyan, it marks the death of ARM's original diplomatic position on the ART conflict.

Let them continue to deny the existence of the Meghri exchange plan. There are high-ranking witnesses [Rob-era ex-MOD]. There is a reason why Vazgen Sargsyan once wrote "Meghri is not just a 'territory'." Vazgen gave speeches and took notes about it.

Pay attention that in the Meghri swap document, Shushi was mentioned as a separate region and not as part of ART proper. This is directly tied to the Shushi negotiations during the 2020 war. Every document that is placed on the table, including the Meghri exchange plan, is an outcome of lengthy talks and doesn't just happen spontaneously. There was a reason why it was proposed. And once you place a document on the table, parts of it never "go away". The [Meghri plan] came back to haunt us during the 2020 negotiations.

Meghri is safe... for now

By the year 2000, the world began to slowly tighten the ring around ARM and ART. The Meghrifor-Karabakh exchange talks would later lead to the 2001 Key West talks, in which ARM was supposed to surrender not the Meghri region as a whole, but an extraterritorial road in exchange for the Lachin corridor.

The biggest difference here is that ART would no longer gain independence - it would have autonomy within AZE. Rob presents Key West as being about ART's independence, but when you read the world press and the diplomatic leaks (sadly there aren't many official archives so we rely also on leaks), it portrays a different picture.

Rob and Serj didn't preserve any archives. After I was elected Premier, I was unable to find official documents on many topics. With great effort, we were able to get the details surrounding their negotiations, including through leaks that happened during various periods.

common state plan

To have a more complete picture of the negotiations, we must also discuss the plan on the formation of a "Common State" between ART-AZE. ARM and ART agreed to negotiate it, despite it entailing that ART would be recognized as part of AZE, while Armenians of ART would carry AZE passports with "Nagorno Karabakh" marking.

AZE eventually rejected the Common State because it would have given ART a high level of autonomy within AZE. Rob, who publicly referred to LTP's proposals as unacceptable and "losing", upon his election as president immediately began discussing plans that would recognize ART as part of AZE. This was kept secret from the public.

keyboard patriots

They were misleading the public. This is when Armenian public TV and weather channels began using maps that depicted ART + 7 regions as part of ARM. These maps began circulating everywhere in public and even in government official offices, even though during negotiations there was never a talk that ARM planned to keep the 7 regions.

Privately: we're ready to recognize ART in its entirety as part of AZE.

Publicly: ART + 7 regions are forever part of ARM.

This is when they renamed Fizuli to Varanda, Aghtam to Akna, Kubatli to Sanasar, Zangelan to Kovsakan, Jabrayil to Mekhakavan, etc.

This is how the "occupied territories" (per LTP and Vardan Oskanyan wording) became "liberated" territories, which then became a "homeland". At least that's what the public saw on the TV box. Around the negotiation table, however, Varanda was still the same Fizuli, while on the ground the "liberated homeland" was being invaded by unruly weed, with some rare occasions of army generals growing wheat on small patches of land by misusing army vehicles, fuel, and soldiers as free labor [🤔 WTF?].

While recognizing ART as part of AZE privately, the officials boasted that ART was and will never be part of AZE, because "ART gained independence from USSR just as AZE did."

enter Madrid Principles

ART's declaration of independence on 10 Dec 1991 had long been ARM's main negotiation ammunition, but ARM leaders decided to take a different course, and after Key West, in 2007 they introduced Madrid Principles.

Madrid Principles = ART's final legal status will be determined by a referendum in the future. It sounded sweet, but it was the death of the remaining hope of realistically achieving true independence for ART.

The moment ARM and AZE agreed to use Madrid Principles as the new basis of future negotiations, it nullified -- politically and diplomatically -- the 1991 recognition of independence by ART.If you are agreeing that the status will be decided during a future referendum, that means you agree that the previous referendum (in 1991) did not decide the status.

Question: if you're nullifying the 1991 referendum results, does that mean it automatically re-validates the previous decision of 1989, in which Soviet Armenia and Soviet Nagorno Karabakh agreed to unify ARM-ART as one state?

Sadly, Madrid Principles legally voided even that one, because if ART's status is yet to be decided in the future, that means 1989 is also nullified.

So if per Madrid Principles ART's status was not decided in 1991 and 1989, that means the status that preceded those two dates was the actively valid one. That's the status of 30 Nov 1989: ART as part of AZE.

Surprisingly, it was ARM's ex-MFA Vardan Oskanyan who authored these principles in Madrid Principles. Oskanyan publicly boasts about being the father of these principles. In reality, Oskanyan is the destroyer of ART's de jure independence from AZE.

enter Serj

Moreover, ARM gov't understood very well the problematic nature of the wording in Madrid Principles. This includes Serj Sargsyan who was preparing to assume the presidency. As Minister of Defense, during his Oct 2005 U.S. trip to Carnage Center, Serj publicly announced: it is a concession by ARM to agree to a second referendum in ART.

So why did Serj and other ex-leaders made such speeches about "concessions"? Serj, for example, was a future president who possibly wanted to build an image as a constructive figure and divert attention from corruption and other illegal processes in Armenia.

It was Serj and his team who began promoting the questionable slogan: "The worst negotiations are better than the best war". I don't think Serj ever understood -- and if he did then it's even worse -- that with "worst negotiations" he was giving AZE time to build an arsenal so they could achieve the "best war" for themselves.

After nullifying the effect of ART's 1991 independence with the hands of ARM leaders, AZE adopted the stance of "give me everything I want peacefully or else I'll take it with force." In other words, they gave AZE time to prepare for war while tying ARM's arms and feet.

During the 17 Nov 2016 interview with Russia Today, Serj stated: we were close to signing a document on a couple of occasions. We agreed for ARM and ART to exit the territories that are currently used as security zones - the 7 regions that AZE calls "occupied". We agreed to leave those regions. This was about meeting the territorial integrity demands, but the document also envisaged a referendum to decide ART's final legal status. The document clarified who would take part in the referendum. AZE rejected the docs and made new demands every time.

Serj during an interview with Armenia TV on 16 July 2017: by unleashing the April War, AZE made it clear that they've rejected the Madrid Principles. This is clear to everyone now. AZE says the issue of ART is its internal issue, and that ART must "remain as part of AZE".

Serj was "surprised" by AZE's new harsh stance, while I'm surprised that Serj was "surprised" by that. After all, it was the Serj administration who - by accepting Madrid Principles - nullified ART's referendums on independence and reunification with ARM. AZE was able to resolve this fundamental issue diplomatically thanks to Madrid Principles.

my neighbor is Azerbaijan, not Artsakh

These diplomatic statements made by ARM's ex-officials were later cemented "de jure" when in 2010 the ARM government adopted a resolution on ARM's administrative division map. The resolution described how the Armenian villagers in Sotq-Meghri section [eastern Armenia] are neighboring the "Republic of Azerbaijan" to the east. [These territories were part of Artsakh as of 2010, but the Armenian law described them as Republic of Azerbaijan]. They de jure accepted that the entire region east of Armenia, even the Lachin corridor section, was the "Republic of Azerbaijan".

Serj's allies are trying to twist the meaning, suggesting that this resolution was merely for internal administrative purposes, but the fact is it's written in black and white where they believe the Republic of Azerbaijan is. The gov't coalition made by ARF and HHK voted in favor of this bill.

Back to Madrid Principles. What exactly did the Armenian side gain by the "concession" described by Serj? [Concession: to ignore the 1991 independence referendum and try to organize a new one]. All we received was merely a "promise" that there would be a referendum sometime in the future.

Moreover, this referendum would need to be approved by AZE first. In practice, AZE would decide when and how late to hold the referendum. This power of "veto" was secured de jure. The document states that, among other things, ARM and AZE would first establish a committee that would work on the referendum details. This committee would make decisions on the basis of CONSENSUS.

the committee was AZE's secret weapon

Moreover, this committee would decide not only WHEN to hold the referendum, but also the TERMS of the referendum. This is a significant nuance because neither Madrid Principles nor any of its future amendments clarify the geographical area where the referendum would be held, leaving it to the ARM-AZE committee to decide. I've mentioned this a dozen times during my Parliament speeches and don't want to get into details again, but AZE was manipulating it with the terms "people", "population", and "residents".

In other words, AZE would want the referendum to take place across the entire territory of AZE and not just ART proper [NKAO], while ARM would disagree to it. Failing to reach a consensus meant no referendum at all.

But even if we assume AZE agrees for the referendum to be limited to ART proper, the Madrid Principles do not actually clarify the conditions under which the referendum is considered "passed".

AZE had its own interpretation based on international practice: they would require the majority of ART's ethnic Azeri population to ALSO vote in favor in order for the referendum to pass. Not just the majority of ART residents, but also the majority of ethnic Azeris within ART, even if Azeris were a minority within ART. This method was used in Cyprus.

So that's another obvious area of disagreement between ARM and AZE. Therefore, the joint committee would not have a consensus and there would be no independence referendum.

Madrid Principles states that there would be no restrictions on the question asked on the referendum ballot. ARM gov't presented this as a major diplomatic victory, but it only shows half of the truth. Don't you wonder why AZE didn't object to it? Because through the joint commission, they could demand the question to be worded as "Do you want ART to have autonomy within AZE?". If ARM disagreed with the wording, then there would be no referendum question and no referendum at all.

5+2

Serj understands the risks and attempts to manage them through the Kazan process. He attempts to promote 2 things: ART would gain a temporary "interim status" while ARM and AZE debated over the final referendum terms, and two of the regions (Kelbajar and Lachin) would be returned to AZE only after the final referendum.

Remember that the original Madrid Principles do not include any such provisions [interim status and 2 delayed returns]. The original Madrid Principles states that ART will have certain rights to organize its life before the referendum, and that all 7 regions would need to be returned. The only exception was Kelbajar which would be returned within 5 years while encouraging the relocation of Armenians living there.

it's your big day

The two provisions [2 regions are returned later, and interim status for ART] were a compromise solution introduced later and supported by OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs. It seems that the Kazan process is advancing. The sides are holding constructive negotiations. It appears AZE supports the process. Under that deal, even if no final referendum is held, ART will still have an interim status which would essentially become a "permanent" one while the Armenian side would maintain control of Lachin and Kelbajar. This would have been great!

ARM and AZE meet on 24 June 2011 in Kazan to sign the agreement. Then something "strange" happens, but not really strange if you've been paying attention: the president of AZE refuses to sign the Kazan paper and proposes 10 additional points.

You'd think that after rejecting the deal AZE would find itself in a difficult diplomatic situation due to its non-constructive stance, but in reality, the opposite happens: Russia agrees to sell $4 billion worth of weapons to Azerbaijan.

AZE launches regular military provocations on the border

2012: 5,972 ceasefire violations, 4 diversionary attacks.

2013: 12,986 ceasefire violations, 4 diversionary attacks.

2014: 37,535 ceasefire violations, 6 diversion attacks, Armenian helicopter is downed.

2015: countless ceasefire violations turn into mini-wars, 14 diversionary attacks.

Despite the aggression, the world is still silent and doesn't prohibit the sale of weapons to AZE. Quite the opposite. In the fall of 2015/early 2016, OSCE Minsk co-chairs, and in particular RUS MFA Sergey Lavrov, present an updated document that no longer mentioned an "interim status" for ART. They told ARM to "forget about an interim status for ART". That meant giving 5 regions to AZE without an interim status. This was a downgrade from Kazan.

Serj rejected the proposal. 2.5 months later AZE launched the April War. It ended with 800 hectares of lost land and a ceasefire agreement that was reached verbally. I said "verbally". There is no document about ending the 2016 April War. In reality, that war never ended.

OSCE co-chairs did not criticize AZE for that aggression. Moreover, later that year, in July 2016 they presented an updated document that was in essence the same as the one rejected by Serj in January, before the war.

Co-chairs later present another updated plan in August 2016. What was the difference? In the previous iteration, the document consisted of two parts: (1) ARM-AZE sign a declaration on the resolution of conflict, (2) a Statement by OSCE co-chairs.

The August plan added (3) UN Security Council gives Gen. Sec. a month to consult with all sides and find out the things necessary for ART to "survive" until the determination of its final status.

AZE rejected this August 2016 plan because Lachin and Kelbajar regions would not be returned immediately. ARM also rejected it because the topic of ART's interim status would be permanently "lost" and would no longer be in ARM's hands.

It was AZE's long-held dream to transfer the topic of ART status to the UN. ARM had always dreaded this scenario because the UNSC would need to make a decision based on its previous resolutions, specifically the 1993 resolutions that state that Armenian forces are occupying Azeri regions and that they must leave immediately and unconditionally, and that Nagorno-Karabakh is a region of Azerbaijan.

If we define it more practically, the regions that Armenian soldiers captured during the first war could not be used as leverage to gain independence by using international platforms because the same international community considered them as illegally occupied.

All 3 co-chairs of OSCE Minsk Group voted in favor of those resolutions. Upon transferring the topic under UNSC's control, they would also consider the UN General Assembly resolutions, the latest of which (62.243, 14 March 2008) essentially reiterated the unfavorable resolutions by the UNSC.

The opposition claims that either way the process was eventually supposed to reach UNSC, but that's misleading. Before the August 2016 document, the UNSC's only role was to give a peacekeeping mandate and to "nod in approval" to whatever ARM and AZE agreed to.

interim status no more

This is a crucial detail. What's the difference between the pre-2016 "interim status" mentioned in Kazan, and the much weaker status envisaged by August 2016? The difference is significant.

Kazan = whatever status ART enjoyed at the time of signing the agreement could become a "de jure" status in practice, along with all the rights.

August 2016 = status means the most basic things necessary for ART people on the ground to organize their daily lives. Not really a "status". The rights granted to ART and its organization would need to be redrawn from scratch, based on a decision by UNSC.

That meant ART would most likely become a region controlled jointly by Armenians and Azeris. Its inhabitants would, as mentioned in Madrid Principles, choose the judiciary and other branches of government, but all the branches would also have Azeri officials. There would need to be security guarantees to return Azeris not only to Shushi but also to other parts of ART. This, in turn, would likely question the existence of ART's existing government, and Azerbaijan would likely demand major changes to it.

This issue is reflected in other parts of the August 2016 document. It states that "ART's representatives must be present during future discussions". You may think it sounds great, but it also includes Azeris when you put it all together.

This was a long-term goal of Azerbaijan that they achieved with the help of Rob and Serj: expel ART's Armenian representatives from the negotiations, then bring ART's representatives back under the condition of introducing Azeri representatives.

after 2016

But as I've said, both ARM and AZE rejected the August 2016 document. ARM said it's too many concessions, AZE said they weren't gaining enough. OSCE attempted to resolve the disagreements in Jan 2018 in Krakow. OSCE suggested that ARM also surrender Kelbajar during the first phase, in exchange for "interim status" for ART.

However, this "interim status", after 3 different iterations, was no longer the same as the originally envisaged interim status. This new interim status was to be decided by the UNSC. I've already explained why it was problematic.

AZE dismisses even this proposal and nothing is achieved in Jan 2018. They reject any "interim status". They also want all 7 regions at once, during the first phase.

It was after this failed Jan 2018 meeting that the newly elected prime minister Serj gave the infamous Parliament speech in April. Serj said: the negotiations do not inspire hope, they have stalled because AZE is pursuing maximalism. Don't think that AZE wouldn't hurt itself while pursuing these maximalist policies. Expect a war from AZE any time.

Serj resigns 5 days later.

Lavrov's Plan

For you to have the full picture of negotiations as of April 2018, one more detail is necessary to mention. After the Kazan failure, an idea was circulated that eventually found itself in the documents presented by OSCE in 2016. ARM was to give 5 regions, ART's interim status would be left for the future. This is what analysts refer to as "Lavrov's Plan". Officially there is no document titled "Lavrov Plan".

Lavrov's Plan would delay the topic of interim status, on top of the final status which would be delayed by the original wording of Madrid Principles. Lavrov's Plan was very similar to the 2016 proposals made by OSCE. No one can accurately predict how it would end, but the 19 Oct 2020 negotiations regarding Shushi's re-population by Azeris might give us a clue.

Moreover, [Russia's poor handling of the 9 Nov 2020 ceasefire agreement] is a testament to what we would have in reality had we agreed to [Lavrov's Plan].

Lachin corridor & Nakhijevan

Post-Madrid negotiation documents never clarified the width of the Lachin corridor and the legal processes behind its utilization. Kazan was an exception - it clarified that Lachin would remain under ART control but still didn't define the width.

You may not be aware of this, but Madrid Principles mention a direct and unobstructed connection between Azerbaijan and Nakhijevan. This explains a chain of events that took place later [during the 2020 negotiations].

Why did AZE agree to enter into the Kazan process at all, if it was "beneficial" to ARM? My analysis is that by doing so, AZE gave Madrid Principles legitimacy, thus diplomatically and legally annulling the previous ART referendums of the past. They entrapped ARM into Madrid Principles after rejecting Kazan.

[Goes into a mega-rant about world powers not doing enough to subdue AZE and even selling them weapons worth billions of $.]

what did Nikol "reject" in 2019?

Upon becoming a Premier after the revolution of 2018, I found a dysfunctional negotiation process. I felt discomfort after reading documents and realizing that they say one thing, while the public was made to believe something completely different.

I would have continued the existing negotiation process had AZE agreed to an interim status for ART per Kazan papers, but they rejected it. I had the following options in 2018:

A) Accept ART as part of AZE.

B) Accept ART as AZE and agree to dismantle ART's internal system.

C) Declare that I'm going to "reboot" the negotiations and launch my own line of talks.

You may recall how the opposition accused me of leading us to war by adopting a "non-constructive" stance by "rejecting OSCE co-chairs' proposal in June 2019". In reality, OSCE did not offer anything new because nothing new happened on the negotiation table between April 2018 [his first day] and June 2019. My administration was new and had not engaged in negotiations yet.

The document OSCE presented in June 2019 was the repackaged process of pre-2018. Even the wording shows it was written well before 2019. It made no mention of a Prime Minister. Armenia had just switched from the Presidential system.

[Read the rest in the comment section...]

With the current Caucasian sphere slowing down and becoming more stable, it is now acceptable for me to give out my analysis of the geopolitical proxy war that was the second Karabakh war, and its implications geopolitically.

We will chronologically rank every country that had won the most in this war. Enjoy the wall of text.

Azerbaijan

The war went extremely favorably from not just the military front, but also geopolitical. Prior to the second war, Aliyev and Azerbaijan was doing horribly and was being embarrassed by Armenia and its military that even Killdim would have blushed.

But everything changed after the November 9 agreements, giving Azerbaijan 4 remaining whole rayons without a fight, and getting Matghis in their territory despite not being under their control, Azerbaijan got the emperor's share in this war and was practically being showered in victories for themselves.

However, despite what people think, the Azerbaijani military itself did horrendously in this war due to their poor preparation, and was deeply reliant on Turkish advisors for proper military support, but it was Aliyev that had all the victories by the end.

Aliyev's regime was never doing well prior to the war, it was economically stagnant and has not recovered from the 2014 economic downturn in oil despite being 6 years after it. Aliyev's regime is very weak after the Armenian velvet revolution happened as it was encouraging the people to revolt against them, meanwhile their military did horribly in the July battles against Armenia, furthermore, this embarrassment continued with the late September battles where the Armenian military pretty much crippled the entire attack force of Azerbaijan in just 5 days (although we lost a lot of guys too from those battles).

Postwar, Aliyev has won many medals and much honor from his population, every mistake he has done has pardoned him with all of his crimes and corruption, he won, and he got 7 rayons, Shushi and Hadrut all at the same time (without Armenians ofcourse!) Not just that, but Azerbaijan can now peacefully threaten Kapan, Goris and many Armenians in Syunik and humiliate their weaker rival in the most satisfying way possible. They can take the Sotk goldmine and intimidate the Armenians with their superior military and superior equipment, while the Armenian government is in disarray, embarrassing itself by awkwardly doing totalitarian moves by recently arresting some of their opponents, while My step's members are leaving by the dozens. And yes, Armenia is suffering the further loss of the Hin Tagher areas and suffering brutal massacres of their military under the Azerbaijani army.

The world has seen Aliyev and Azerbaijan's might, and they are impressed by their miracle drone tactics and their total victory against their old opponent by killing 4000 of their soldiers.

Future

Ilham Aliyev's rule has pretty much been assured for the next 8-10 years, while the first fives years will have nothing but praise, the last five years will be all but turmoil from all three sides, military, economic and political.

Our favorite Aliyev puppet and leader and head of Caspian Report SeaSnakeX had made a great quote

It is easier to tear a country down than it is to rebuild one.

And indeed this is the problem that Ilham Aliyev has pulled himself into, he has mainly three problems to deal with and, realistically only one can be dealt with.

Internally, speaking there are three more problems that are going to take 4 Russian loans to fix just for one to be even remotely be considered fixed. The first and easiest will be military, this is not a large problem, but a significant number of LAV's, tanks and AFV as well as the special forces core has been completely wiped clean from the earth. Not a big issue, but with dwindling money, fixing this problem will be valuable in the long run, but not beneficial for the main problems for Azerbaijan that they are currently suffering from.

The two remaining problems will be the biggest undertaking Azerbaijan can ever do to just complete one of them.

The seven Rayons are a great victory, but a great expense for Azerbaijan to rebuild themselves, realistically, Azerbaijan will need to spend up to 3 billion dollars to just get these Rayons into a functional area, and that is not accounting for the absolute shit-storm tier military problems they are facing in Kelbajar. People think Syunik and Artsakh are a security problem, but really, it is Kelbajar that is going to be the most vulnerable area in the whole of Caucasia, that place needs to house at least 80,000 people alone, and have decent quality of living, and have decent military on top of that, and that is still counting housing another 520,000 refugees from the 7 rayons that need security, jobs and proper governance.

The 7 Rayons are a big problem, but when your economy is so dysfunctional it makes the Armenian economy in the 90's looks good. Azerbaijan with its heavy oil reliance has led to complete economic failure for Azerbaijan. Aliyev's economic policy of just relying on oil prices has left Azerbaijan into a banana republic, diversification plans have utterly failed to even remotely give proper growth and 90% of their export revenue is still under oil. Even if Azerbaijan had a competent economic team (which they barely do) it would take years for Azerbaijan to get out of its oil dependency. For some perspective, both Armenia and Georgia, after 25 fucking years, have 50-70% of their economy be related to either mining or agriculture, and most of their industry is heavily support by agriculture and imports, and these economies are vastly better and more developed, and what Azerbaijan is aiming for these 10 years to get to. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan's agricultural muscle (its historical advantage) represents only 3% at best in its export base, all of it is going to Russia.

While oil prices are suspected to increase and peak in the 2040's, they will all exclusively be in the developing third world (Africa and India), most nations like China, and Europe are heading towards alternative energy, this is where Azerbaijan exports the most, further making the Azerbaijani economy even more screwed than it already is. Mind you, Azerbaijan will not be the only one in this situation, Saudi Arabia is even more screwed over.

The question is if Azerbaijan collapses economically, it's when. I can't predict that unfortunately, best case scenario is a great depression, worst case, 90% of what Venezuela is suffering right now in 7 years.

Do you think problems like these are near crisis level? We are not even getting into the nation's internal and geopolitical problems yet.

The real issue for Aliyev is hereditary, who is going to succeed him? Emil Samanyan suggested his wife Mehraba Aliyeva, but Azerbaijan is as macho and male dominated as Armenian leadership is right now, so if she is the leader of Azerbaijan, she will be a short regent, no one wants a fucking Tik-toker run Azerbaijan with plastic surgeons on her everyday. The real successor to Azerbaijan will be Heydar Aliyev (not the one who died in 2003) We know very little of Heydar, the kid is barely older than me by 2 years, and he does not look fit for a leader currently, but in 10 years, maybe. This is the same kid who bought a shit load of mansions at age 14 in 2012 by the way. The problem with Heydar is that when he does take power in 10 years when his father steps down due to his unpopularity, he will be a in a world with a hostile Azerbaijani population, with less experience and a much worse position his father was in 2003 than he was, the geopolitical atmosphere will have changed vastly, and much less to Azerbaijan's favour in the future.

Geopolitically, Azerbaijan is as isolated and alone as Armenia and Georgia is, the West doesn't care about them, and the rest of the planet barely acknowledge that each one exists, the West is a no go anymore. This leads to Azerbaijan's real ally to be its recent Turkish alliance. Turkey will be a good and bad thing, the good thing is all of the given things that Azerbaijan has problems with can be resolved by 10 Turkish loans each. The problem with that is Turkey will demand more political control in Azerbaijan, furthermore, any point of Turkish influence will always be met by Russian hostilities as they will see Azerbaijan as another Georgia, a traitor and a puppet. Iran will be even more hostile to Azerbaijan, Azerbaijani relations are even worse with Iran currently than they have ever been with the recent changes of the geopolitical front.

This is the price of victory.

Russia

The mighty Russian, once seen as the power of the Caucasus has been shaken by the Osmans Turks.

Russia did very poorly in this war, their perceived inactivity in the eyes of their allies (Armenia) was not a good image, but there is far more to this than what meets the eye.

Russian policy was to keep the balance of power in the Caucasus, Russia enjoyed the status quo because they were the mediators and jockeys of the conflict, they were very wary of Azerbaijan, but as long as they satisfied them with favorable promises such as returning the 7 rayons, it would have been enough. Unfortunately, Russia's power has been waning for decades. Georgia and Moldova were the first traitors to abandon Russia, and were punished as a result of their disloyalty. Russia further became weary as its Central Asian subjects began shifting into their own interests and not in Russia with Uzbekistan being an example and Turkimenistan, a growing disloyal power, and Tajikistan and Kyrgistan, becoming a sphere in China rather than Russia. This left Russia even more xenophobic and feared more of its own allies were beginning to desert them.

At the same time, Russia knew very well that Azerbaijan's recent military investment in the late 2000's and early 2010's were alarming as the balance of power shifted towards Azerbaijan.

Russia began a program of financing the Armenian military by giving Armenia 3 loans and a military arms deal, with a military discount on top, this puts the amount of military investment the Russians gave to the Armenians were close to 1.5 billion dollars from 2014-present. Russia is still continuing to invest in Armenia as they know they are a "Loyal" ally so far.

But remember when I said how weary Russia had become? Russia could not trust Armenia to hold the balance of power, Russia's heavy handed tactics of hard power was not effective and the geopolitical front in the Caucasus will be met with hostilities with Turkey Russia feared that if a resolution could arrive, it would make Armenia leave Russia's sphere of influence, ending Russian supremacy in the Caucasus altogether. Therefore, Russian policy changed to the Madrid principles. This change in stance was clear by 2016 when Serzh Sargsyan began realizing that Russia would no longer be willing to help Armenia in the Artsakh war, keeping a mediating stance to the war (despite Russia losing power as a result). Russia still favored Armenia mind you, but they wanted themselves in control.

The war caught the Russians off guard. The Turks were in Azerbaijan and they no longer had power in Azerbaijan, this was a disaster. Not just the Russians could not make a military response, but also had no capable way of defeating the powerful Tb2's effectively. This left Russia in a humiliating and embarrassing stance in the war, they essentially wrote the Lavrov plan to give a compromise to Azerbaijan so that they can remove the Azerbaijanis from the Turkey's grasps.

What makes it ever more humiliating for Russia is that most of the military tech Armenia had, was all from Russia and made by Russia. All of it was destroyed from a couple of Turkish drones. These weren't 60's weaponry, they were 90's-2000's systems built to fight some powerful tech.

After pressuring Armenia to do the Lavrov plan, they had gained, basically half of Artsakh, and turning Armenia into a complete dependency to Russia.

The Lavrov plan was very insidious, it gave legal precedence for Russian occupation of Artsakh and complete control of it, and expunged Turkey from even remotely being part of it. Russia basically pulled the rug on Turkey by making their own "brothers" betray them by signing the Lavrov plan, screwing them over.

Future

This is a Russian victory, no doubt, Russia had tricked the Osmans and made their Azerbaijani puppets be on their side temporarily, however, Russia is not going to be masterful planer as we think, nor are they this malevolent deity that can dominate the Caucasus, take nothing but cowardice for their act of treachery for leaving their only loyal ally for dead in this war.

Russia has no power over Armenia, but they have power over Artsakh, and that is enough to keep the Armenians in their sphere for decades. Decades, will not be this status quo unfortunately.

Russia is growing weaker by the day, and this war only made them breath a little longer.

Russia's diplomatic failure and heavy reliance of hardpower has led to them to total diplomatic collapse of all of their allies. Russia needs to understand that they are not the USSR anymore, they are a pathetic power that had just thrown their own ally to the ground and ran away from their own backyard being pillaged by an idiot from Ankara, and yet, all they do is throw territory for appeaset to Azerbaijan? Appeasement only shows you can't fight.

Russia knows this, they don't like it.

Russia has tried to make the Armenians happy by trying to take some territory in Shushi to make Azerbaijani habitability in Shushi impossible, but also open the border for Armenia to benefit from it. All of this is purely the benefit of Armenia, Azerbaijan has no reason not to trade with their sworn enemy.

As an Armenian myself to any Russian lurker here, let me tell you this how we feel.

Do you think a patch of land, and opening the borders are going to make us not betray you after the Karabakh conflict is resolved because of your cowardice in this war? The Armenians no longer want to be part of Russia anymore, they despise them and find them unreliable and cowardly. They are now a disloyal ally only there for Artsakh, they will not stop any minute until Artsakh is under their rule no matter what.

Russia knows this to, that's why they are keeping Artsakh hostage. They want bloodthirsty revenge to the Turks, and particularly, Azerbaijan for humiliating them, and making them do what they did to their only bastion of Russian influence (Armenia).

Russia will not threaten Armenia, it's too risky, removing and installing Kocharyan will spell the end of Russian influence as the Armenian population is outright hostile to Russia right now. As for Azerbaijan, you may as well consider the 5 year occupation as a deadline for Azerbaijan, if Azerbaijan continues in its direction with Turkey by the end of 2025, Russia will become a threat to Azerbaijan.

There will be a war, it will be started by Russia or Azerbaijan, it depends on who is pathetic enough to do it.

Georgia

Georgia got nothing and lost nothing in this war, but it is now in the worst geopolitical position in the Caucasus, even worse than Armenia.

Georgia dreamt of being on the side of the West, but the West doesn't care about Georgia, this left Georgia as a defenseless nation with no response to Russian aggression in the Caucasus. Georgia's only real allies in the Caucasus are Armenia and Azerbaijan, they are brothers to them, but when their brothers are killing each other and joining the enemies that Georgia is trying to keep away from is difficult to impossible.

Georgia tried to keep a neutral ground, but was quickly intimidated by Turkey to be loyal to them, Georgia did nothing, Georgia can do nothing in this conflict.

Future

Georgia is the most isolated country of the three Caucasian states, Georgia has, realistically, two options, one is drinking two cups of lava, and the other is getting shot four times.

The first option is drinking lava, negotiating with Russia will be a humiliating deal for the Georgians, they gave them ruin, and all they're doing is sucking up to the Russians, angering Turkey and becoming a Russian puppet with no policy of its own. Russia will oppress the Georgian people, but not kill the democratic government. Hey, at least you got Abkhazia and South Ossetia back!

The second option is getting gun downed basically, but Georgia can survive as long as it finds a way to stop the bleeding from Russian and Turkish wounds. Joining the newly forming Turkish Hegemony is not a bad idea, but it's the least bad option Georgia finds itself in, this will always make Russia become a threat no matter what and make Georgia, basically become a dependency for Turkish defense against Russian aggression. The Turks are a danger to Georgia, take no doubt, but it's better than being a puppet to the Russians.

Georgia must pick a side

And it literally will be the Switzerland of the Caucasus, this country is flawless in domestic and internal manners, Democracy is great baby.

Iran

Iran is the sleeping giant in this conflict, it is the "Third option" or the "Wild Card" Iran is the Shia power that is slowly turning into a hegemon of its own, although its economy has done poorly as a result of the US, Iran is a beast that not even the Turks can take on alone without sacrificing an arm and a leg.

For some truth, Iran has always favoured the Armenians over the Azerbaijanis, Iran sees Azerbaijan (especially right now) as nothing but a Turkish wannabe and a puppet of Turkey against Iranian interest.

Therefore, the war came at a complete surprise to Iran as it did to Russia when they realised it was orchestrated by the Turks. The Iranians were always in a hands-off attitude to the conflict as long as there was no large scale war, and as long as Russia kept Turkey out of the Caucasus.

Well then, things have changed for the worse. Geopolitically, Iran see's Azerbaijan as a complete security threat to themselves, and Turkey is the main opponent, with Russia potentially making an exit from the conflict or from the horizon entirely, and being humiliated by the Turkish army is an extremely alarming sign for Iran, as Turkey is essentially becoming the next Sunni power that they must defeat or try limiting its influence.

Iran is currently cooking up a plan probably to know what they are trying to do in the Caucasus and what type of investments can they make, their main role will be trying to limit the growing Turkish influence happening in Syria, Iraq, Israel, Egypt and now Azerbaijan, all of it choking Iran's western empire.

Future

Muhammed Javad Zariff is an excellent diplomat, but his statements and opinions towards Armenia and Azerbaijan represent an excellent view on what Iran thinks.

"We are happy for the liberated territories"

Iran has consistently always demanded that the Armenians withdraw from the 7 rayons, and here, Iran is happy to see the 600,000 people (100,000 are from Armenia and they will never get their homes back.) get their homes back. Unfortunately, it is the only agreement both the Azerbaijanis and Iranians can agree on.

"Armenia's territorial integrity is the red line to Iran"

As a young analyst, this was by far the most aggressive Iran has ever been in the Caucasus, this statement proves that Iran is extremely unhappy of the changes of the Status-quo, and fear Turkish dominance in the Caucasus with Azerbaijan as its fortress. Iran therefore, will put in great priority to arm and protect Armenia from any type of aggression from Turkey or Azerbaijan, Artsakh included**. They want status from Artsakh, and not an autonomous republic in Azerbaijan.**

Iran will not be an ally of Russia, Russia won't be an ally of Iran, but both will have similar interests of keeping Turkish influence out of the Caucasus, with the help of the Armenians. Interests are priority, not idealism.

Iran will become a very large player in the future of the third war, they will be on the Armenian side, not Russian.

Turkey

The Osman terror. Let me be very honest with you, Turkey was the one responsible for the second Karabakh war, nothing is even remotely proving that Turkey was not the reason why Aliyev got so cocky in this war.

Turkey is the mastermind of this war, and was the military victor of this war, they had not just crushed the pathetic Armenians, but also humiliated the Russians on the geopolitical front, the Russian went flying and cowering in fear when TB2's began to dominate the skies of Artsakh, under the Turkish flag the Azerbaijanis walked in victory. The flags, mercenaries, drones and commandos, all came from Turkey themselves, they are the masterminds of this war after all.

So why did Turkey do it?

Ultranationalism..... ^{and they got nothing out of it.}

Turkish leadership currently seems to be extremely competent at running Turkey into the ground.

I cannot fucking imagine what on earth was the megalomaniac decisions of Erdogan is at throwing Turkey into basically three fucking fronts, and losing all three of them at the same time, and, somehow, pissing off Russia, France, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Balkans and making the USA and EU more hostile. Seriously, Erdogan is the worst leader in the Caucasian front and has completely drowned himself in Turanistic Neo-Ottoman delusions, fascists and near Hitlerian levels of racism.

If one can literally see the timeline of Turkey, Turkey literally did what Germany did before WW2 in just 8 fucking months.

Original Turkish policy was to never get itself involved against stronger or equal powers, the Caucasus is essentially an arena of Iran and Russia, all that don't like Turkey. Not just that, but Turkey's main objective was to extend its influence in the Balkans and the Middle east, which itself is very challenging as the nation faces equally powerful foes such as Egypt.

Hilariously, Mr. Erdogan decided to throw all of that away, and pretty much go the same way Germany did in 1938, and decide to be militarily aggressive by joining in more proxy wars and break their heads into territory they have rarely found themselves into. Turkey is a powerhouse, but Turkey cannot fight 4 other regional superpowers at once, and therefore, becomes an easy scapegoat and a boogeyman for all.

As for the karabakh war, do you know what they got at the end after spending what could be 200 million dollars? A fucking joint Russian-Turkish monitoring base in a city that won't be function in maybe five years? (Agdam) Erdogan is the real clown here.

Future

The Turks need to re-analyze how to properly handle their newly owned subjects like Georgia, Azerbaijan and Israel currently, being an idealistic moron and believing in brotherly turanism is going make Turkey look like Nazi Germany, which would give an easy casus bellie for every nation that wants Turkey gone.

Turkey will still get Azerbaijan, however, being charitable is and should not be an option, donate when Azerbaijan is willing to give more concessions than it is worth, and always keep Turkish interests at heart, just because Azerbaijan is your "brother" doesn't mean excluding them from the rest of your dependencies, because your Turkic brother just threw you under the Lavrov plan bus and you got nothing out of it, do not be too feeble next time to be tricked again ffs.

Overall, Turkey will continue to become a growing power in the Caucasus, their dependencies of Georgia and Azerbaijan leave only one little Caucasian state left, it is Armenia.

Turkey has much reason to negotiate and make a few concessions, because if they can make a few concessions like allowing Armenia to have Artsakh, and recognize the Armenian Genocide, it will give an insane amount of power in the Caucasus, essentially becoming the new Turkish Backyard. Turkey is a powerful foe for Armenia, but Turkey see's Armenia as the last opponent to bring into their empire, and once they do, the Russians will be defenseless.

Turkey has much to conquer and much to dominate, but a leadership change and a change in mentality to follow world standards will make Turkey become a superpower if they do it.

Armenia

Armenia, the big fat loser of this war, we got all of it. We lost Artsakh as a result of the Lavrov plan, Azerbaijanis humiliated us in Syunik, and currently protests are happening on a daily basis by the 17 parties (RoboSerzh), the oligarchs smell blood, and the Armenians are bleeding from every orifice that is being created everyday.

It doesn't stop there, the economic situation of Armenia has deteriorated as a result of 30-40,000 Armenian refugees from Artsakh, meanwhile, the Covid-19 epeidemic has killed 4000 people and has infected another 160,000 people, poor policy is a result. The country is in chaos and is sombering as their defeat from an overwhelming Turkish backed Azerbaijani force has crushed them.

Their armies buried, their allies betrayed them. The only thing that is even remotely positive for Armenia is that it isn't falling into a Syrian civil war and be invaded by aliens, hell has come and the world collapsed under Armenia. It seems pretty bleak.

Future

The future looks about the same as what we had before the war...

Do you think anything for Armenia has changed? Russia doesn't want Pashinyan gone why would they? Kocharyan and the 17 parties will utterly fail because half the population already supports Pashinyan, and 2/3rds of Armenia see the 17 parties as nothing but incompetent and corrupt fools. People don't want Pashinyan, but 100% don't want Roboserzh to be back, and that pretty much leaves Armenian democracy in a gray zone of uncertainty.

The Armenians really haven't had a problem with economic reform and good governance ever since Serzh Sargsyan came to power.

Serzh Sargsyan, while a corrupt leader no doubt, he pretty much pulled Armenia from a thug infested dumpster fire, to an emerging economy, his excellent decision making made Armenia go above and beyond the horizon and put Armenia on the road to developing industry, AI, IT, and giving Armenia some nice drones of his own. Pashinyan came to power, changed nothing and dialed anti-corruption by 900% and gave Armenia a booming prosperous economy by 2019, our economy before the epidemic was 10% year-on-year.

The future internally looks bright for Armenia, the nation will develop its excellent industry and will most likely end up just like Georgia in 5 years, in 10 years. Despite all the doom and gloom, Armenia and Georgia will be centres of excellence in the Caucasus, and we will see this in the future.

There are however, two real issues Armenia has to resolve.

The first issue are the elections in 2024.

The delay is excellent because it gives more time for a proper and new opposition to rise up, and potentially replace My Step (My step won't go away, just become a powerful opposition party). There is a big problem for this, as Eric hacopian has said, we are all fine with who participates in the government, as long as the previous government isn't in power or has connections. We really don't want these idiots in power, they put Armenia in this position and made us weaker in the long run.

Armenia will pretty much end up like Georgia, as long My Step doesn't get too shady or become another HHK in those 3 years.

The second problem is geopolitical, and it is not good.

A proxy war is inevitable between Russia and Turkey, and Armenia will be in the frontlines, Artsakh is at stake and the Russians are all but happy to never give us back Artsakh as long as they want, we must make concessions and forget about the 7 rayons. We must negotiate with the Azerbaijanis and get Shushi and Hadrut and Talish back from them, we have lost so much, and slacking off is what lead to us in our defeat against Turkey.

Russia should not be trusted, if Artsakh is free and under Armenian control, leave the Russians, they have become a security threat to our nation.

Don't worry about Syunik, Syunik is so heavily protected by Iranian and Russian interests that even the USA in the 90's would never touch it, worry about our institutions, leadership and foreign policy, we are isolated and we are damn well not going to become another Georgia.

And next time, I don't want to see 4000 new graves. We lost badly, and it came at a large cost to us.

This is the price of total defeat.

Conclusion

It took me a good 3 hours to write this up, I have been thinking about the future in every possible scenario, and this is what lead to my research, the future looks harsh for everyone, and we, as a people, as a nation, must always prepare for the worst.

:Edit: thank you for the gold!

Before the First Nagorno-Karabakh War both sides were part of the Soviet Union. Their military aged males were trained in the Soviet army. Both their officer corps were products of Soviet military education and presumably fought using the same tactics and strategy they were trained in under the USSR.

According to Wikipedia at least the Azeri side had much more equipment and a much larger population. It rather vaguely cites more experience on the part of the Armenians but doesn't go into much detail.

Why were the Armenians able to win despite the two armies having similar force-structures, but the Armenians have material inferiority relative to the Azeris?